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Since its inception in 2005, the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic 
Partnership Agreement (the ‘P4 Agreement’) has been hailed as a 
‘high standard’ free trade agreement (FTA). However, there has 
never been any official explanation as to how the assessment of the 
Agreement is conducted. Now it’s exam time again, let’s see how 
the Agreement performs in ‘Free Trade 101’. 
 
To be deemed as ‘high-standard’, an agreement must satisfy two 
requirements. 
Firstly , it must fulfil the requirements under he General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Art. XXIV and the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services (GATS) Art. V on trade coverage and 
elimination of trade barriers; 
Secondly, it must provide higher levels of market access and less 
restrictive non-tariff rules than other Agreements. 
Regarding market access in goods, whilst the Agreement provides 
very high trade coverage, it lags behind other agreements, such as 
the Chile-Australian FTA, in terms of both the depth of initial tariff 
reduction and length of the phase-in period. 
In terms of the rules of origin (ROO), the Agreement provides for 
40-50% Regional Value Content, and this is much higher than most 
other FTAs and more restrictive. Furthermore, the Agreement only 
allows bilateral accumulation but not extended accumulation. Both 
of these features, coupled with the use of different types of ROO 
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schemes in the Agreement, would put the Agreement squarely into 
the group of more restrictive FTAs. 
With regards to the rules on trade remedies, again the Agreement 
proves to be rather disappointing. While many of the more liberal 
FTAs choose to eliminate or at least restrict the use of trade remedy 
measures, the P4 Agreement explicitly allows the use of trade 
remedy measures so long as the measure is permitted under either 
the respective WTO agreements or the P4 Agreement itself. 
In addition to goods, the Agreement also covers services. On its 
face, the services commitments in the Agreement appear to be 
quite liberal as the Agreement adopts a ‘negative list’ approach in 
scheduling the commitments, meaning that obligations on national 
treatment, most favoured nation (MFN) and market access apply to 
all covered sectors in all four modes unless otherwise noted. Closer 
examination reveals, however, that this is not quite the case. First, 
the Agreement has carved out entire sectors, such as the financial 
services sector. Second, under Annexes III & IV, the parties can not 
only maintain existing reservations to their scheduled commitments, 
but also introduce new measures that do not conform to the basic 
obligations. 
In summary, contrary to the popular claim that the Agreement is a 
‘high-standard’ FTA, the P4 Agreement really provides nothing 
remarkable. In the ever-expanding galaxy of FTAs, it is at best a 
white dwarf, rather than a supernova as its creators would want 
others to believe. With a mark of ‘C-’ for market access for goods, 
rules of origin, and trade remedy rules, and a ‘B-’ mark for services 
commitments, the Agreement runs the risk of being kicked out of 
the ‘school of free trade’ very soon, unless it gets its act together 
fast enough to turn this missed opportunity into something real. 
This post is part of a series of articles on the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership. 
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